There are passages in which the law, instead of limiting power, seems to expand its boundaries to touch territories that contemporary conscience considered to be long surpassed. The approval by the Knesset of the law introducing the death penalty for Palestinians convicted of deadly attacks
ISRAEL. The measure, vigorously promoted by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and supported by the government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, introduces a form of punitive automatism that marks a discontinuity in Israeli legal history. The use of the death penalty, which has so far been confined to exceptional cases – including that of Nazi official Adolf Eichmann – is now inscribed in an ordinary logic, applied selectively and in a context of military occupation.
However, to fully understand the implications of this decision, it is necessary to broaden the perspective. Israel is not the only country that maintains the death penalty in its legal system. Even in the United States, often cited as a model of liberal democracy, it continues to be practiced in a significant part of the federal territory.
The American geography of the death penalty reveals an internal fracture. States like Texas, Florida, Alabama, and Oklahoma continue to impose and apply it with some frequency; others, like California and Pennsylvania, formally maintain it but under moratorium; many – including New York, Illinois, and Virginia – have abolished it in recent decades. A disparate mosaic emerges, in which opposing views of criminal justice coexist.
However, the parallelism cannot stop at mere normative observation. In the United States, the death penalty – although contested – is embedded in a legal system that, at least formally, guarantees a high degree of procedural protection and does not explicitly distinguish between citizens based on ethnic or territorial affiliation in the law. In the Israeli case, however, the new legislation specifically applies to Palestinians in the occupied territories, introducing a differentiation that affects the principle of equality before the law.
This is where the issue takes on a deeper significance. It is not only about the “whether” a democracy can still resort to the death penalty, but about the “how” and the “to whom” it is applied. A sanction that is already extreme in itself becomes even more problematic when it is based on a legal distinction between populations.
The reflection of the Catholic Church, developed over time and made explicit by the teachings of Pope Francis, is placed on an even more radical level. The death penalty is declared inadmissible not because of its methods of application, but for what it represents in itself: the denial of the inviolable nature of human life. In this perspective, there is no substantial difference between the various legal systems that uphold it; what changes is rather the degree of awareness with which such a contradiction is accepted.
The comparison with the United States highlights a significant element. There, the historical trend is clearly oriented towards a gradual reduction in the use of the death penalty, both through legislative abolitions and through moratoriums and jurisprudential restrictions. The overall movement appears, despite contradictions, aimed at limiting its application.
The most difficult question remains in the background. Israel faces a concrete threat, characterized by violent attacks and a security that is constantly called into question. Even in the United States, the persistence of the death penalty is often justified by the need to respond to the most heinous crimes. But Western legal history teaches us that the strength of a state does not lie in the severity of its punishments, but in its ability to impose limits on its punitive power.
Ultimately, the comparison between Israel and the United States does not diminish the seriousness of the choice, but rather illuminates its meaning. It shows how the death penalty is not a legacy confined to authoritarian contexts, but rather a possibility that is always present even in democracies. For this reason, any reintroduction or expansion of it takes on a symbolic value that transcends national borders.
When the law claims the right to take life, what is decided is not only the fate of a condemned person. It is the very idea of justice that is being redefined. In this space, where law and conscience meet, the Christian tradition continues to remind us that there is a limit that no reason of state should cross.
