Italian
One is optimistic, one is realistic, and one is critical. However, they all start from the same observation: the Gulf has entered a new phase of strategic instability
IRAN. After the recent conflict between Iran and the United States, which ended with a fragile truce, the monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) find themselves in a complex position. While they have avoided the collapse of regional security, thanks in part to American military support, the Gulf countries have discovered their vulnerability to a new form of pressure: a war capable of rapidly crossing borders and strategic infrastructures, as demonstrated by the threats to the Strait of Hormuz.
In this context, analysts and international research centers outline three possible trajectories for the future of the GCC, namely the Gulf Cooperation Council (in Italian Consiglio di Cooperazione del Golfo), a political and economic organization that brings together six countries of the Arabian Peninsula: Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain.
A scenario of greater cooperation
The most optimistic scenario envisions a strengthening of cooperation among the six member states — Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman.
The war would have demonstrated the need for an integrated defense, particularly in the field of air defense. A common missile warning and interception system could become the first real step towards shared security. At the same time, collaboration in the production of military technologies is anticipated, reducing dependence on Western supplies.
On the economic front, the acceleration of infrastructure connections — such as the Gulf railway project — could reduce the vulnerability of maritime routes, while new existing pipelines demonstrate the willingness to bypass potential blockades of the Strait of Hormuz.
In this scenario, the differences among the members would be seen as a resource: Oman’s diplomatic capacity, Saudi Arabia’s financial power, and the technological innovation of the Emirates would integrate into a common strategy.
The most likely scenario: limited cooperation
According to many observers, a more realistic scenario is one of continuity.
The war would not produce a true structural integration, but only a strengthening of the already existing collaborations in an emergency form: exchange of military information, temporary coordination of air defense, and joint management of certain logistical emergencies.
The historical divisions among Gulf countries — economic, political, and strategic — would indeed remain intact. The recent crisis would also have introduced a new element of friction: the differing interpretations of the responsibilities of the conflict and the roles of the United States and Israel.
The Emirates tend to strengthen their axis with Washington and Tel Aviv, while other countries, such as Oman, maintain a more critical position. Saudi Arabia, in the middle, continues to oscillate between diplomatic pragmatism and regional caution. These differences make it difficult to achieve a real leap forward in the integration of the GCC.
The critical scenario: new fractures in the Gulf
The worst-case scenario is one of increasing internal fragmentation.
The competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may intensify, turning into an open strategic rivalry. The two economic powers of the Gulf are already competing on investments, regional influence, and relations with major powers.
An additional factor of division concerns Israel: a greater openness of the Emirates towards Tel Aviv could accentuate the distances with other GCC members, where public opinion remains strongly critical.
Finally, the management of relations with Iran and the United States could produce divergent strategies: some countries might prioritize deterrence and military strengthening, while others seek diplomatic compromises with Tehran to avoid retaliation.
In this scenario, the Gulf would risk becoming an area of internal competition rather than cooperation, exposing itself more to external influence.
A choice still open
Despite the differences, one conclusion emerges clearly: the future of the GCC will depend on the ability of its members to act as a cohesive bloc.
The war has shown that no Gulf country can guarantee its own security alone in an increasingly unstable regional context. The choice between cooperation and fragmentation is not only political but strategic: it concerns the region’s very ability to maintain control over its own destiny.
