Italian
In the monumental choreography of the Great Hall of the People, amidst national anthems, children with flags, and handshakes measured to the millimeter, the seventh meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump presents the world with a photograph that is only seemingly reassuring: the two superpowers speak the language of cooperation while continuing to prepare for strategic competition
CINAL The official message coming from Beijing is clear: “partners, not rivals.” But behind the diplomatic formulas lies a much less peaceful truth. The summit does not establish a new harmony between the United States and China; rather, it certifies that Washington and Beijing have understood the cost of a direct confrontation. It is the diplomacy of mutual deterrence.
Xi Jinping has chosen his words with extreme care. He has once again evoked the “Thucydides Trap,” the theory that the rise of an emerging power almost inevitably leads to conflict with the dominant one. This is not an academic reference: it is a political warning. Translated from the language of Chinese caution, it means that Beijing now views the confrontation with the United States as structural and permanent.
And this is where Taiwan returns to the center of the global stage.
The most important phrase from the summit does not concern tariffs or trade. It is the one in which Xi warns that if the Taiwanese issue is “mismanaged,” the two countries could head towards “collision or even confrontation.” In diplomacy, especially in Chinese diplomacy, words are never left to chance. Xi is telling Trump that Taiwan represents the absolute red line of the Chinese Communist Party.
The White House has notably avoided mentioning Taiwan in its official report. An omission that is almost as significant as a statement. Trump wants to avoid immediate escalation and aims to freeze the planet’s most dangerous dossier while seeking economic and geopolitical advantages elsewhere.
Because the second true protagonist of the summit is the Middle East.
Washington and Beijing have found common ground on Iran: no nuclear weapons for Tehran and the need to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz. It is a tactical agreement, not a strategic one, but it signals a new reality. The United States needs China more than it was willing to admit a few years ago. Beijing is the main buyer of Iranian oil and has economic leverage that can impact regional balances. Trump knows this. Rubio has stated explicitly: China is both “the main geopolitical challenge” and “the most important relationship to manage.”
It is the perfect definition of the new world order.
Globalization is not over; it has transformed into a competitive coexistence. China and the United States are simultaneously trying to reduce their mutual dependence and avoid an irreversible break. They continue to compete in semiconductors, rare earths, artificial intelligence, maritime routes, and industrial chains. But neither can yet afford total decoupling.
For this reason, the Beijing summit appears as a gigantic exercise in balance: enough cooperation to avoid chaos, enough rivalry not to relinquish hegemony.
Trump arrives in China with a delegation of financiers, tech giants, and CEOs of major American multinational companies. Xi responds with selective openings on trade and new licenses for U.S. agricultural exports. It is the return of economic pragmatism after years of trade war. But no one is under the illusion that Boeing, soybeans, and bilateral talks are enough to erase strategic distrust.
On the contrary, it is precisely the simultaneous presence of economic cooperation and military tension that makes this historical moment particularly fragile. The two superpowers are building a relationship based not on shared values, but on the mutual necessity to avoid the worst.
Meanwhile, human rights remain in the background. The case of Jimmy Lai, mentioned by Trump with little success, demonstrates how this issue has now become subordinate to realpolitik. The United States continues to formally defend freedom and democracy, but the confrontation with China is now primarily played out on the ground of power.
Here is the true meaning of the Beijing summit: not the birth of a new friendship between Xi and Trump, but the acknowledgment that the world has definitively entered the era of competitive bipolarism.
The 21st century Cold War will not be identical to that between Washington and Moscow. It will be more interdependent, more economic, more technological, and perhaps more unpredictable. Global trade chains will prevent total confrontation for as long as possible. But Taiwan remains the point where diplomacy, nationalism, and imperial ambitions risk converging.
Xi made it clear. Trump understood it. The problem is to understand if the world is really ready to coexist for so long on the brink of collision.
